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GENDER DISCRIMINATION AGAINST REFUGEES

I.

Introduction:

In 1951, the United Nations established a multilateral treaty known as the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which set out certain basic guidelines
on the eligibility of individuals claiming refugee status, rules relating to the process of
granting asylum, rights of refugees and the obligations of nations granting asylum
(hereinafter referred to as the 1951 Convention). 1 The 1951 Convention further builds
on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (UDHR), which codifies
customary international law and recognizes the right of all persons to seek asylum
from persecution in other countries. Article 7 of the UDHR also states that everyone is
entitled to its rights and freedoms without discrimination of any kind, including gender
discrimination. 2 The UDHR also ensures that men and women have equal rights in
marriage, and that everyone has the right to own property, the right to work and free
choice of employment, and the right to education.

However, there is still criticism of international law today because despite the
apparent neutrality of the law and its and interpretations, women are still discriminated
against, stereotyped and unfairly disadvantaged. For example, the 1951 Convention
does not recognize gender as a ground of persecution under which individuals can
claim refugee status. Although women suffer similar forms of persecution like men,
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e.g. torture, unlawful detention etc., in addition, there are other forms of gender related
persecution such as sexual assault and rape that are unique to women simply because
they are women. 3 In order to better understand this problem, it is important to note that
the term ‘gender’ is often erroneously used synonymously with the term ‘sex’ – which
is biologically defined, while gender refers to the social organization of sexual
difference or rather, the construction of power relations between women and men. 4
Gender differences and relations change with the historic, cultural and geographic
context of the situation – meaning that the experience of being a man or a woman
changes with time and place. The UNHRC has also further clarified that gender is not
static or innate but acquires socially and culturally constructed meaning over time.
Gender related claims therefore, may be brought by either men or women - although
due to particular types of persecution, they are more commonly brought by women. 5
Thus, if the goal of the international community is to create fair and effective refugee
laws which apply equally to all human beings - it becomes extremely important to
understand the specific way in which gender (versus just sex, which is biological)
influences the life and circumstances of a refugee. 6

For this reason, many jurists argue that Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention
should be extended to include women suffering from gender specific persecution such
3
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as human trafficking, rape and other sexual assaults, unique to her social and
geographic context. According to Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention, the term
‘Refugee’ applies to any person who: “owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for the reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside his country of origin and is unable or
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or
who, not having a nationality and being outside the county of his former habitual
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it.” 7

This definition establishes five grounds of persecution – race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or on the basis of holding a
political opinion. Even though women and children form over 80% of the total number
of displaced persons in the world, it is still the case that in the determination process,
male applicants seeking asylum are significantly more successful in obtaining refugee
status. 8 While there is nothing explicit that precludes women from being recognized as
refugees, the way member states have interpreted these instruments still reinforces and
reflects gender biases. The standard adopted by the law, though it may prima facie
appear to be entirely gender neutral, continues to disadvantage women by not taking
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into account their special circumstances. I have analyzed below some of the significant
ways in which the application of the 1951 Convention unfairly affects women, and
how member states have attempted to remedy this situation through interpretation and
domestic legislation.

II.

Differences in Persecution

Public forms of persecution, like civil and political harms, are more likely to
affect men, and have therefore historically been the primary focus of refugee
protections, and of human rights more broadly. Harms that are more likely to occur in
the private sphere – like gender specific violence, rape, sexual assault and human
trafficking are much more likely to affect women and have therefore been excluded
from the realm of violations that earn an individual refugee status. 9 Further, the
traditional view of a refugee is that of a male activist, persecuted or displaced as a
result of his political actions against the State. 10 While the 1951 Convention was not
necessarily drafted with the intention of distinguishing between male and female
refugees, even in practice, it has failed to address these forms of persecution that are
gender specific.

Given this background, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR)’s Executive Committee encouraged member states party to
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the 1951 Convention to adopt guidelines recognizing claims by women who faced
private discrimination on the basis of gender: “In accordance with the principle that
women’s rights are human rights, these guidelines should recognize as refugees,
women whose claim to refugee status is based upon well-founded fear of persecution
for reasons enumerated in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, including
persecution through sexual violence or other gender-related persecution.” 11 It has
been argued that the current framework fails to protect women who need specialized
protection from types of harms that are particular to their gender - including but not
limited to rape, sexual assault, dowry related bride burning, female genital mutilation,
forced marriage, domestic violence, forced abortion, female infanticide etc.

12

Additionally, in many countries today, women are also not adequately protected from
the harms of living in a male dominated society, in which many of their fundamental
rights have been denied to them. 13

Many international law jurists have argued that women suffer particular forms
of oppression solely because they are women, completely independent from their
political opinion or ethnicity. The situation today in many middle-eastern countries
like Syria reflects this reality. Given that the 1951 Convention does not attempt to
bring this type of persecution within its ambit is evidence that it was developed from a
male paradigm since it more accurately reflects male applicant’s factual situation. As a
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response to this criticism, the UNHCR has recommended that member states develop
specialized procedures for the determination of women’s refugee status, and that
asylum-seekers who may have suffered sexual violence be treated with particular
sensitivity, recognizing that women refugees often experience persecution differently
than men. 14

Rape and other forms of sexual violence which women are subject to can often
be motivated by political reasons – and has occurred in parallel with genocide in many
areas of armed conflict. For example, the ‘ethnic cleaning’ carried out in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia, where specific forms of violence were used against women
as a means of interrogation. 15 Government officers or opposition militants could also
commit these crimes against civilian women as part of a larger strategy to terrorize the
population. Thus, in these situations the harm itself may have been intended for the
males in the community through raping or sexually assaulting their women, but the
injuries are internalized by women victims because they are required to bear the
physical consequences in addition to dealing with the social stigma that usually
follows these types of crimes. 16 However, women detained for non-political reasons
are also just as frequently subject to rape or sexual assault – and when it is state actors
who are carrying out these acts, it seems appropriate that this would rise to the level of
persecution against women, under which they should be able to claim refugee status.
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III.

Women as a ‘Social Group’

In 1986, five Iranian nationals, one of whom was a woman, sought political
asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the woman claimed that she was
subject to special reprisals because of her sex. The Federal Office granted the
applicants asylum because of their well-founded fear of persecution due to their
political activities. 17 In addition, the woman was found to have belonged to a specific
social group of Iranian women, who were subject to persecution specific to that group.
The Office held that “the ideologically based power of men over women, results in a
general political repression of women and children in defiance of their individual
liberties and human rights.” 18 In a similar case in the United Kingdom, the court
denied asylum based on the ‘social group’ category even though it recognized that
women and children could be protected under it. The way the court applied the law
clearly indicates the problem of protecting persecuted women as a social group rather
than recognizing gender as a basis of persecution. In this case, an Iranian woman
sought asylum in the UK based on the basis of her position as a woman in Iran. Her
application was denied. One of the conclusions of the Appeal Tribunal was that the
‘social group’ provision means membership in a group that can be identified and has
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common practices or beliefs, but that there was no evidence that Iranian women and
children considered themselves a social group separate from other Iranians. 19

The United States courts have agreed with such a narrow reading of the term
and have likewise made it difficult for women to rely on this category to flee gender
based persecution. The Ninth Circuit has developed a test for what constitutes a social
group in the decision Sanchez-Turijillo v. INS, 20 where the court stated: “The phrase
‘particular social group’ implies a collection of people closely affiliated with each
other, who are actuated by some common impulse or interest. Of central concern is
the existence of a voluntary associational relationship among the purported members,
which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as a
member of that discrete social group.” Further, the court also observed that such an
all-encompassing grouping as the petitioners were trying to fit themselves into was not
the type of cohesive, homogeneous group, which would come under the term
‘particular social group’.

The Second Circuit subsequently relied on this definition to deny a Salvadorian
woman refugee status. In Gomez v. INS, 21 a woman sought asylum because she had
been repeatedly battered and raped by Salvadorian guerrillas. She claimed that because
of these attacks she became a member of a social group singled out for persecution in
El Salvador. However, the court held that she failed to produce evidence that women
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who have previously been abused by the guerrillas possess certain common
characteristics other than gender and youth, such that persecutors could identify them
as members of the purported group. In other cases however, US courts have granted
political asylum to male refugees who claimed persecution in their countries on the
basis of sexual orientation. Since the state was unable to protect its citizens from abuse
and rape which they were subjected to as a result of their sexual orientation, courts
found that refugees in these cases possessed a well-founded fear of persecution
because there has been culture of severe discrimination against homosexuals that
existed in their home countries. Thus, because homosexuals were the victims of
targeted violence on account of their sexual orientation, they were recognized as a
‘social group’ and received asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 1965
(INA). 22

Under the UNHCR guidelines, the category of ‘membership of a particular
social group’ cannot be interpreted as to render the other Convention grounds
superfluous or as a catchall provision applying to all persons fearing persecution.
According to the guidelines, a social group cannot be defined exclusively by the fact
that it is targeted for persecution. 23 There is also no closed list of what groups may
constitute a particular social group. Rather, the phrase ‘membership of a particular
social group’ should be read in an evolutionary manner, open to the diverse and
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changing nature of groups in various societies and evolving norms of international
humanitarian law. 24

As an alternative to obtaining refugee status as a social group, persecuted
women could try to seek protection under the political opinion or religion category –
which has been discussed below. However in this context, it is important to note that a
woman's refusal to abide by the traditions of her country is often not based on any
political opinion or religious belief she may hold. Rather, it is may be based on her
personal distaste for that particular tradition, for which the State may punish her
without any consequences under International law. 25

Now however, the international community is beginning to recognize the need
for broadening the definition of refugee to include those fleeing gender-based
persecution. In April 1984, the European Parliament adopted a resolution, which
called on states to recognize the right of women in certain countries who face harsh or
inhuman treatment because they are considered to have transgressed the social norms
of the country in which they live to be considered a “social group” within the meaning
of the 1951 Convention. 26

The inconsistent use of the social group category by member countries, as
indicated by these cases, is the result of the UNHCR’s failure to define it in precise
24
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terms. Judges and practitioners who attempt to define or apply it consider factors such
as ethnic, cultural, and linguistic origin, education, family background, economic
activity, shared values, outlook, and aspirations. Another important factor they take
into account is the attitude of the State toward the purported social group and how they
have been disadvantaged as a result of failing to receive state protection. 27 However,
in the countries discussed above, women and children do not seem to be perceived of
by their governments or the rest of society as a distinct cohesive group with common
beliefs and practices – which could explain why they are not automatically recognized
as a separate social group under the 1951 Convention.

IV.

‘Political Opinion’ in the context of Gender Specific Crimes

However, although gender-related persecution like rape and other sexual
assault are being accepted as a valid ground for persecution in Canada and the US,
women victims of these crimes still face difficulties in producing the appropriate
evidence, as they are also required to prove that there was a failure of the state to
adequately protect them. 28 The biggest challenge faced by women in this regard is that
claims of rape, sexual assault or other gendered crimes can only be made on at least
one of the five grounds of the Convention. Currently, the two most frequently used
grounds are the ‘social group’ category and ‘political opinion.’ 29
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Although cases in the United States have laid down a rather broad definition of
political opinion, women still face significant difficulty in bringing their claims under
this ground because they are usually not directly involved in political activities. 30
Courts have held that women have the burden of showing the nexus between their
political opinion and the fear of gender-related persecution, and also that the state is
unable or unwilling to protect them. 31 As a result, women are still less successful since
most rape and sexual violence have no connection to their political opinion, and many
of those who suffer such persecution are not publicly involved in politics. 32 Generally,
while women are less likely than men to be involved in high profile political activities,
it has been found that they are more often integral in carrying out ‘low level’ political
activities that comprise of private activities like - providing food, clothing, medical
care, pass messages from political activists or hiding people. 33 This is because in some
societies, overt demonstrations of political opinion by women may not be permissible,
as women are not even allowed to formally participate in the political life of the
community.

30
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Because of this reason, it has been argued that a woman’s challenge of the
particular social conventions that govern her, and her being sexually assaulted as a
result should be considered persecution on the basis of her ‘political opinion.’

34

Further, questions regarding whether a woman is free to wear a veil or not, to be
subject to genital mutilation, to exercise her right to education, or to be free from male
violence are essentially about demarcating private rights from the public sphere. Any
conflicts concerning these private rights are acts of political resistance, and that is how
they should be considered when evaluating women’s claims for refugee status.
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Some courts have applied this broad definition with more success, like the Fifth
Circuit, in Coriolan v. INS, overruled the opinion of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), which held that people without overt political activity are unlikely to be victims
of persecution. The court further held that “citizens can be the focus of government
persecution without ever taking any conventionally political action at all.” 36

In another case, the Ninth Circuit held that a perpetrator of sexual assault had
imputed political opinion onto his victim, Ms. Lazo-Majano. He believed that because
she was a woman - she belonged to a class of persons that he could dominate or
suppress. The perpetrator warned the victim that since he was an army officer, no
authorities would get involved, and that he could legally have her tortured and killed if
she attempted to seek protection from the State. Therefore, her resistance against these
crimes was considered to be a political act based on the opinion that women are to be
34
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treated equally and with basic dignity. 37 However, since this case directly contradicts
the Fifth Circuit case of Sofia Campos-Guardado v. INS, there is currently a conflict
among the Circuit Courts as to whether rape creates a well-founded fear of persecution
on account of political opinion. 38

V.

Conclusion - The Move toward a Broader Definition?

In 1995, the INS issued new guidelines (INS Guidelines) for evaluating
women’s asylum claims based entirely or in part on their gender. These INS
guidelines, which formally recognized gender-based persecution as a potential ground
for asylum, expanded the definition of ‘refugee’ by including those fleeing genderbased persecution. 39 The INS guidelines state that the determination that sexual abuse
may be serious enough to amount to persecution does not by itself make out a claim
for asylum. 40 The applicant are still required to demonstrate that they have been
persecuted or have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of one of the five
protected grounds under the 1951 Convention. 41 To establish persecution, it is required
that the applicant prove that the harm was inflicted by government agents or
alternatively, by a non-government entity that the state is unable or unwilling to
control. 42 As we seen from the cases above, many claims involving instances of rape
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or sexual abuse, tend to lack an identifiable state actor or group, which complicates
this process for women refugees.

The INS guidelines are an attempt to clarify the distinction between public and
private acts. In a usual case, the government will be the alleged perpetrator of the
crimes. But however, in cases against women – questions frequently arise regarding
whether an act committed or threatened by a government official was nevertheless a
purely private one. 43 Such cases may also involve public officials who commit what is
socially considered to be a private act. The guidelines provide that in these situations
adjudicators are required to determine whether there is a reasonable basis for regarding
the act in question as a ‘public’ act, which can then be attributed to the government or
even to an agent that the government is unable or unwilling to control. Consequently,
applicants must frame private acts such as rape or sexual abuse in the language of the
public sphere. 44 However, in some cases the persecutor may not be a government actor
and in these cases, the burden is still on the petitioner to show that the state is unable
or unwilling to protect its citizens from these kinds of harms.

In the case of Klawitter v. INS, the Sixth Circuit denied political asylum to a
Polish woman who had been blacklisted for refusing to join the Communist Party and
was subsequently sexually assaulted by a colonel in the Polish secret police. 45 The
court held that the colonel’s actions were motivated by personal desire, rather than
43
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from any interest on his part to persecute her. 46 This decision highlights the distinction
courts place between acts that are considered ‘public’ versus ‘private’, and also reveals
the inconsistent nature of the outcomes of refugee claim cases. In drawing these lines,
acts found to be within the private sphere - such as sexual offenses are often not seen
as persecution. It has been argued that such cases reflect the lack of a cohesive
framework within which to evaluate the gender-related claims of women. 47 Although
each of the cases discussed above have raised either a claim based on ‘political
opinion’ or a ‘social group’ argument, US courts have made disparate determinations
of when persecution under either of these categories existed.

Although the INS Guidelines have achieved a greater degree of protection for
women refugees, there remains a lack of predictability in the adjudication of genderbased asylum claims. By specifically recognizing these harms as forms of persecution,
adjudicators appear to no longer have the power to determine whether one act of rape
is sufficient to qualify as ‘persecution’. 48 These decisions demonstrate that the
standards employed to evaluate asylum claims have been applied inconsistently, and
have thus created a system that lacks cohesion and predictability. In the context of
gender-based persecution claims, the lack of guidance on what definitively constitutes
“persecution” has left the term open to different levels of interpretation. It has been
argued that the basis for success on any asylum claim is affected not only by which
particular immigration judge the case has been assigned to, but also by various other
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factors like the gender and political views of the judge, past work experience etc. 49 In
conclusion, I think creating a more uniform system by removing the requirement of
certain grave crimes committed in the personal sphere (like rape, sexual assault or
female genital mutilation) from qualifying under one of the five categories from the
1951 Convention might ensure more favorable treatment toward women refugees and
prevent gender based discrimination.

49
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